The Art of Action - by Stephen Bungay

A few words about the book: The Art of Action - How Leaders Close the Gaps between Plans, Actions and Results by Stephen Bungay

The book

WHAT HAS NOT BEEN MADE SIMPLE CANNOT BE MADE CLEAR AND WHAT IS NOT CLEAR WILL NOT GET DONE. - The author

Judging from the tile I expected this book to be another leadership book but it was definitely not.

Auftragstaktik is a military strategy developed in the Prussian empire at the end of the 19th century, perfected by the germans during ww2 and because of its success was adopted by many armies (including Nato).

War is a chaotic system, as such its future is not predictable beyond the first contact with the enemy, military success thus needs to incorporate the flexibility to deal with the evolving situation. How is that achieved ?

The army has a top down hierarchical structure of course, but it has elements of flexibility, new groups can be created and dismantled as the situation dictates.

The backbone of the organization is the offices corp. Generals and commanders are responsible for understanding the bigger picture and creating effective overall strategies. Soldiers on the ground are responsible for responding quickly and effectively to an evolving battle situation.

The Academy is the fundamental instrument in building the organization. Its purposes: a rigorous selection mechanism, professional skills training, and importantly the development of a group of people who would make similar judgments and behave in similar ways because they shared a common doctrine.

Independent action by subordinates as a matter of principle. Officers are encouraged to show initiative and seize opportunities as they arise.

Communication chain is important and orders must be passed down “to the last man”. But since this chain can get disrupted people must remain in charge at all levels, processes should not dominate people. There is strictness and rigor associated with passing down information. Mission briefing must adhere to the highest standards.

The mission briefing is more like a guideline to empower subordinates to act, it’s not a command to be carried out exactly as laid out. The information it must contain: an account of the situation, a short statement of the overall intent, an explanation of the more specific task, guidance about boundaries and unknown factors. In Nato jargon this is called mission command.

What comes out of all this is an organic structure that combines the best of central planning and freedom resulting in an organization that is dynamic and can quickly adapt to changing conditions.

In 1977 US Army Colonel Trevor Dupuy said this about the german army in ww2 testament to the efficiency of their strategy:

On a man for man basis, the German ground soldier consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.

Besides the historical and military side there’s a wealth of examples in the book on how to apply this knowledge to business organizations.

Quotes

Some quotes from the book mostly by von Moltke

On the characteristics of war

No plan of operations can extend with any degree of certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main body.1 Only a layman could imagine that in following the course of a campaign he is watching the logical unfolding of an initial idea conceived in advance, thought out in every detail and pursued through to its conclusion. Whatever the vicissitudes of events, a commander will need to keep his mind fixed unwaveringly on his main objectives, but he can never be certain beforehand which paths offer the best hopes of realizing them. Throughout the campaign he will find himself forced to make a whole series of decisions as situations arise which no one was able to predict.

On the importance of initiative

There are numerous situations in which an officer must act on his own judgment. For an officer to wait for orders at times when none can be given would be quite absurd. But as a rule, it is when he acts in line with the will of his superior that he can most effectively play his part in the whole scheme of things … not commanding more than is strictly necessary, nor planning beyond the circumstances you can foresee. In war, circumstances change very rapidly, and it is rare indeed for directions which cover a long period of time in a lot of detail to be fully carried out

On the mission briefing.

Do not command more than is necessary, or plan beyond the circumstances you can foresee

Orders were to be clear: logically arranged, short sentences, using universally understood expressions and railroad designations – 0700 for 7 a.m. and 1900 for 7 p.m. Orders were to be precise: subordinates were to be made acquainted with the intentions of their superior. Orders were to be complete – distinguishing the part that each unit was asked to perform. Orders were to be short. The rule was that they should never contain a single word by the omission of which their meaning would not be suddenly and completely affected

The higher the level of command, the shorter and more general the orders should be. Te next level down should add whatever further specification it feels to be necessary, and the details of execution are let to verbal instructions or perhaps a word of command. This ensures that every- one retains freedom of movement and decision within the bounds of their authority.

Micromanagers are a problem even in the army

In any case, a leader who believes that he can make a positive difference through continual personal interventions is usually deluding himself. He thereby takes over things other people are supposed to be doing, effectively dispensing with their efforts, and multiplies his own tasks to such an extent that he can no longer carry them all out. Te demands made on a senior commander are severe enough as it is. It is far more important that the person at the top retains a clear picture of the overall situation than whether some particular thing is done this way or that.

Links

• book: Vom Kriege - Carl von Clausewitz
• book: Helmuth von Moltke and Aufragstaktik
• book: The theory of war - Helmuth Von Moltke
• book review on goodreads